List of Report Key Findings

Jump to Key Finding: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5,

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 1

    The global climate continues to change rapidly compared to the pace of the natural variations in climate that have occurred throughout Earth’s history. Trends in globally averaged temperature, sea level rise, upper-ocean heat content, land-based ice melt, arctic sea ice, depth of seasonal permafrost thaw, and other climate variables provide consistent evidence of a warming planet. These observed trends are robust and have been confirmed by multiple independent research groups around the world. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 2

    The frequency and intensity of extreme heat and heavy precipitation events are increasing in most continental regions of the world (very high confidence). These trends are consistent with expected physical responses to a warming climate. Climate model studies are also consistent with these trends, although models tend to underestimate the observed trends, especially for the increase in extreme precipitation events (very high confidence for temperature, high confidence for extreme precipitation). The frequency and intensity of extreme high temperature events are virtually certain to increase in the future as global temperature increases (high confidence). Extreme precipitation events will very likely continue to increase in frequency and intensity throughout most of the world (high confidence). Observed and projected trends for some other types of extreme events, such as floods, droughts, and severe storms, have more variable regional characteristics.

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 3

    Many lines of evidence demonstrate that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. Formal detection and attribution studies for the period 1951 to 2010 find that the observed global mean surface temperature warming lies in the middle of the range of likely human contributions to warming over that same period. We find no convincing evidence that natural variability can account for the amount of global warming observed over the industrial era. For the period extending over the last century, there are no convincing alternative explanations supported by the extent of the observational evidence. Solar output changes and internal variability can only contribute marginally to the observed changes in climate over the last century, and we find no convincing evidence for natural cycles in the observational record that could explain the observed changes in climate. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 4

    Global climate is projected to continue to change over this century and beyond. The magnitude of climate change beyond the next few decades will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse (heat-trapping) gases emitted globally and on the remaining uncertainty in the sensitivity of Earth’s climate to those emissions (very high confidence). With significant reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases, the global annually averaged temperature rise could be limited to 3.6°F (2°C) or less. Without major reductions in these emissions, the increase in annual average global temperatures relative to preindustrial times could reach 9°F (5°C) or more by the end of this century (high confidence).

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 5

    Natural variability, including El Niño events and other recurring patterns of ocean–atmosphere interactions, impact temperature and precipitation, especially regionally, over months to years. The global influence of natural variability, however, is limited to a small fraction of observed climate trends over decades. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 1: Our Globally Changing Climate
    Key Finding 6

    Longer-term climate records over past centuries and millennia indicate that average temperatures in recent decades over much of the world have been much higher, and have risen faster during this time period, than at any time in the past 1,700 years or more, the time period for which the global distribution of surface temperatures can be reconstructed. (High confidence)

  • Chapter 10: Changes in Land Cover and Terrestrial Biogeochemistry
    Key Finding 1

    Changes in land use and land cover due to human activities produce physical changes in land surface albedo, latent and sensible heat, and atmospheric aerosol and greenhouse gas concentrations. The combined effects of these changes have recently been estimated to account for 40% ± 16% of the human-caused global radiative forcing from 1850 to present day (high confidence). In recent decades, land use and land cover changes have turned the terrestrial biosphere (soil and plants) into a net “sink” for carbon (drawing down carbon from the atmosphere), and this sink has steadily increased since 1980 (high confidence). Because of the uncertainty in the trajectory of land cover, the possibility of the land becoming a net carbon source cannot be excluded (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 10: Changes in Land Cover and Terrestrial Biogeochemistry
    Key Finding 2

    Climate change and induced changes in the frequency and magnitude of extreme events (e.g., droughts, floods, and heat waves) have led to large changes in plant community structure with subsequent effects on the biogeochemistry of terrestrial ecosystems. Uncertainties about how climate change will affect land cover change make it difficult to project the magnitude and sign of future climate feedbacks from land cover changes (high confidence).

  • Chapter 10: Changes in Land Cover and Terrestrial Biogeochemistry
    Key Finding 3

    Since 1901, regional averages of both the consecutive number of frost-free days and the length of the corresponding growing season have increased for the seven contiguous U.S. regions used in this assessment. However, there is important variability at smaller scales, with some locations actually showing decreases of a few days to as much as one to two weeks. Plant productivity has not increased commensurate with the increased number of frost-free days or with the longer growing season due to plant-specific temperature thresholds, plant–pollinator dependence, and seasonal limitations in water and nutrient availability (very high confidence). Future consequences of changes to the growing season for plant productivity are uncertain.

  • Chapter 10: Changes in Land Cover and Terrestrial Biogeochemistry
    Key Finding 4

    Recent studies confirm and quantify that surface temperatures are higher in urban areas than in surrounding rural areas for a number of reasons, including the concentrated release of heat from buildings, vehicles, and industry. In the United States, this urban heat island effect results in daytime temperatures 0.9°–7.2°F (0.5°–4.0°C) higher and nighttime temperatures 1.8°– 4.5°F (1.0°–2.5°C) higher in urban areas, with larger temperature differences in humid regions (primarily in the eastern United States) and in cities with larger and denser populations. The urban heat island effect will strengthen in the future as the structure, spatial extent, and population density of urban areas change and grow (high confidence).

  • Chapter 11: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States
    Key Finding 1

    Annual average near-surface air temperatures across Alaska and the Arctic have increased over the last 50 years at a rate more than twice as fast as the global average temperature (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 11: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States
    Key Finding 2

    Rising Alaskan permafrost temperatures are causing permafrost to thaw and become more discontinuous; this process releases additional carbon dioxide and methane, resulting in an amplifying feedback and additional warming (high confidence). The overall magnitude of the permafrost–carbon feedback is uncertain; however, it is clear that these emissions have the potential to compromise the ability to limit global temperature increases.

  • Chapter 11: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States
    Key Finding 3

    Arctic land and sea ice loss observed in the last three decades continues, in some cases accelerating (very high confidence). It is virtually certain that Alaska glaciers have lost mass over the last 50 years, with each year since 1984 showing an annual average ice mass less than the previous year. Based on gravitational data from satellites, average ice mass loss from Greenland was −269 Gt per year between April 2002 and April 2016, accelerating in recent years (high confidence). Since the early 1980s, annual average arctic sea ice has decreased in extent between 3.5% and 4.1% per decade, become thinner by between 4.3 and 7.5 feet, and began melting at least 15 more days each year. September sea ice extent has decreased between 10.7% and 15.9% per decade (very high confidence). Arctic-wide ice loss is expected to continue through the 21st century, very likely resulting in nearly sea ice-free late summers by the 2040s (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 11: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States
    Key Finding 4

    It is very likely that human activities have contributed to observed arctic surface temperature warming, sea ice loss, glacier mass loss, and Northern Hemisphere snow extent decline (high confidence).

  • Chapter 11: Arctic Changes and their Effects on Alaska and the Rest of the United States
    Key Finding 5

    Atmospheric circulation patterns connect the climates of the Arctic and the contiguous United States. Evidenced by recent record warm temperatures in the Arctic and emerging science, the midlatitude circulation has influenced observed arctic temperatures and sea ice (high confidence). However, confidence is low regarding whether or by what mechanisms observed arctic warming may have influenced the midlatitude circulation and weather patterns over the continental United States. The influence of arctic changes on U.S. weather over the coming decades remains an open question with the potential for significant impact.

  • Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise
    Key Finding 1

    Global mean sea level (GMSL) has risen by about 7–8 inches (about 16–21 cm) since 1900, with about 3 of those inches (about 7 cm) occurring since 1993 (very high confidence). Human-caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to GMSL rise since 1900 (high confidence), contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 years (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise
    Key Finding 2

    Relative to the year 2000, GMSL is very likely to rise by 0.3–0.6 feet (9–18 cm) by 2030, 0.5–1.2 feet (15–38 cm) by 2050, and 1.0–4.3 feet (30–130 cm) by 2100 (very high confidence in lower bounds; medium confidence in upper bounds for 2030 and 2050; low confidence in upper bounds for 2100). Future pathways have little effect on projected GMSL rise in the first half of the century, but significantly affect projections for the second half of the century (high confidence). Emerging science regarding Antarctic ice sheet stability suggests that, for high emission scenarios, a GMSL rise exceeding 8 feet (2.4 m) by 2100 is physically possible, although the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot currently be assessed. Regardless of pathway, it is extremely likely that GMSL rise will continue beyond 2100 (high confidence).

  • Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise
    Key Finding 3

    Relative sea level (RSL) rise in this century will vary along U.S. coastlines due, in part, to changes in Earth’s gravitational field and rotation from melting of land ice, changes in ocean circulation, and vertical land motion (very high confidence). For almost all future GMSL rise scenarios, RSL rise is likely to be greater than the global average in the U.S. Northeast and the western Gulf of Mexico. In intermediate and low GMSL rise scenarios, RSL rise is likely to be less than the global average in much of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. For high GMSL rise scenarios, RSL rise is likely to be higher than the global average along all U.S. coastlines outside Alaska. Almost all U.S. coastlines experience more than global mean sea level rise in response to Antarctic ice loss, and thus would be particularly affected under extreme GMSL rise scenarios involving substantial Antarctic mass loss (high confidence).

  • Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise
    Key Finding 4

    As sea levels have risen, the number of tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called “nuisance floods”) have increased 5- to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities (very high confidence). Rates of increase are accelerating in over 25 Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities (very high confidence). Tidal flooding will continue increasing in depth, frequency, and extent this century (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 12: Sea Level Rise
    Key Finding 5

    Assuming storm characteristics do not change, sea level rise will increase the frequency and extent of extreme flooding associated with coastal storms, such as hurricanes and nor’easters (very high confidence). A projected increase in the intensity of hurricanes in the North Atlantic (medium confidence) could increase the probability of extreme flooding along most of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coast states beyond what would be projected based solely on RSL rise. However, there is low confidence in the projected increase in frequency of intense Atlantic hurricanes, and the associated flood risk amplification and flood effects could be offset or amplified by such factors as changes in overall storm frequency or tracks

  • Chapter 13: Ocean Acidification and Other Ocean Changes
    Key Finding 1

    The world’s oceans have absorbed about 93% of the excess heat caused by greenhouse gas warming since the mid-20th century, making them warmer and altering global and regional climate feedbacks. Ocean heat content has increased at all depths since the 1960s and surface waters have warmed by about 1.3° ± 0.1°F (0.7° ± 0.08°C) per century globally since 1900 to 2016. Under a higher scenario, a global increase in average sea surface temperature of 4.9° ± 1.3°F (2.7° ± 0.7°C) by 2100 is projected, with even higher changes in some U.S. coastal regions. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 13: Ocean Acidification and Other Ocean Changes
    Key Finding 2

    The potential slowing of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC; of which the Gulf Stream is one component)—as a result of increasing ocean heat content and freshwater driven buoyancy changes—could have dramatic climate feedbacks as the ocean absorbs less heat and CO2 from the atmosphere. This slowing would also affect the climates of North America and Europe. Any slowing documented to date cannot be directly tied to anthropogenic forcing primarily due to lack of adequate observational data and to challenges in modeling ocean circulation changes. Under a higher scenario (RCP8.5) in CMIP5 simulations, the AMOC weakens over the 21st century by 12% to 54% (low confidence).

  • Chapter 13: Ocean Acidification and Other Ocean Changes
    Key Finding 3

    The world’s oceans are currently absorbing more than a quarter of the CO2 emitted to the atmosphere annually from human activities, making them more acidic (very high confidence), with potential detrimental impacts to marine ecosystems. In particular, higher-latitude systems typically have a lower buffering capacity against pH change, exhibiting seasonally corrosive conditions sooner than low-latitude systems. Acidification is regionally increasing along U.S. coastal systems as a result of upwelling (for example, in the Pacific Northwest) (high confidence), changes in freshwater inputs (for example, in the Gulf of Maine) (medium confidence), and nutrient input (for example, in agricultural watersheds and urbanized estuaries) (high confidence). The rate of acidification is unparalleled in at least the past 66 million years (medium confidence). Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), the global average surface ocean acidity is projected to increase by 100% to 150% (high confidence).

  • Chapter 13: Ocean Acidification and Other Ocean Changes
    Key Finding 4

    Increasing sea surface temperatures, rising sea levels, and changing patterns of precipitation, winds, nutrients, and ocean circulation are contributing to overall declining oxygen concentrations at intermediate depths in various ocean locations and in many coastal areas. Over the last half century, major oxygen losses have occurred in inland seas, estuaries, and in the coastal and open ocean (high confidence). Ocean oxygen levels are projected to decrease by as much as 3.5% under the higher scenario (RCP8.5) by 2100 relative to preindustrial values (high confidence).

  • Chapter 14: Perspectives on Climate Change Mitigation
    Key Finding 1

    Reducing net emissions of CO2 is necessary to limit near-term climate change and long-term warming. Other greenhouse gases (for example, methane) and black carbon aerosols exert stronger warming effects than CO2 on a per ton basis, but they do not persist as long in the atmosphere; therefore, mitigation of non-CO2 species contributes substantially to near-term cooling benefits but cannot be relied upon for ultimate stabilization goals. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 14: Perspectives on Climate Change Mitigation
    Key Finding 2

    Stabilizing global mean temperature to less than 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels requires substantial reductions in net global CO2 emissions prior to 2040 relative to present-day values and likely requires net emissions to become zero or possibly negative later in the century. After accounting for the temperature effects of non-CO2 species, cumulative global CO2 emissions must stay below about 800 GtC in order to provide a two-thirds likelihood of preventing 3.6°F (2°C) of warming. Given estimated cumulative emissions since 1870, no more than approximately 230 GtC may be emitted in the future to remain under this temperature threshold. Assuming global emissions are equal to or greater than those consistent with the RCP4.5 scenario, this cumulative carbon threshold would be exceeded in approximately two decades. (High confidence)

  • Chapter 14: Perspectives on Climate Change Mitigation
    Key Finding 3

    Achieving global greenhouse gas emissions reductions before 2030 consistent with targets and actions announced by governments in the lead up to the 2015 Paris climate conference would hold open the possibility of meeting the long-term temperature goal of limiting global warming to 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels, whereas there would be virtually no chance if net global emissions followed a pathway well above those implied by country announcements. Actions in the announcements are, by themselves, insufficient to meet a 3.6°F (2°C) goal; the likelihood of achieving that goal depends strongly on the magnitude of global emissions reductions after 2030. (High confidence)

  • Chapter 14: Perspectives on Climate Change Mitigation
    Key Finding 4

    Further assessments of the technical feasibilities, costs, risks, co-benefits, and governance challenges of climate intervention or geoengineering strategies, which are as yet unproven at scale, are a necessary step before judgments about the benefits and risks of these approaches can be made with high confidence. (High confidence)

  • Chapter 15: Potential Surprises: Compound Extremes and Tipping Elements
    Key Finding 1

    Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the climate system have the potential to accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth’s climate system, in part or in whole, into new states that are very different from those experienced in the recent past (for example, ones with greatly diminished ice sheets or different large-scale patterns of atmosphere or ocean circulation). Some feedbacks and potential state shifts can be modeled and quantified; others can be modeled or identified but not quantified; and some are probably still unknown. (Very high confidence in the potential for state shifts and in the incompleteness of knowledge about feedbacks and potential state shifts).

  • Chapter 15: Potential Surprises: Compound Extremes and Tipping Elements
    Key Finding 2

    The physical and socioeconomic impacts of compound extreme events (such as simultaneous heat and drought, wildfires associated with hot and dry conditions, or flooding associated with high precipitation on top of snow or waterlogged ground) can be greater than the sum of the parts (very high confidence). Few analyses consider the spatial or temporal correlation between extreme events.

  • Chapter 15: Potential Surprises: Compound Extremes and Tipping Elements
    Key Finding 3

    While climate models incorporate important climate processes that can be well quantified, they do not include all of the processes that can contribute to feedbacks, compound extreme events, and abrupt and/or irreversible changes. For this reason, future changes outside the range projected by climate models cannot be ruled out (very high confidence). Moreover, the systematic tendency of climate models to underestimate temperature change during warm paleoclimates suggests that climate models are more likely to underestimate than to overestimate the amount of long-term future change (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change
    Key Finding 1

    Human activities continue to significantly affect Earth’s climate by altering factors that change its radiative balance. These factors, known as radiative forcings, include changes in greenhouse gases, small airborne particles (aerosols), and the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface. In the industrial era, human activities have been, and are increasingly, the dominant cause of climate warming. The increase in radiative forcing due to these activities has far exceeded the relatively small net increase due to natural factors, which include changes in energy from the sun and the cooling effect of volcanic eruptions. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change
    Key Finding 2

    Aerosols caused by human activity play a profound and complex role in the climate system through radiative effects in the atmosphere and on snow and ice surfaces and through effects on cloud formation and properties. The combined forcing of aerosol–radiation and aerosol–cloud interactions is negative (cooling) over the industrial era (high confidence), offsetting a substantial part of greenhouse gas forcing, which is currently the predominant human contribution. The magnitude of this offset, globally averaged, has declined in recent decades, despite increasing trends in aerosol emissions or abundances in some regions (medium to high confidence).

  • Chapter 2: Physical Drivers of Climate Change
    Key Finding 3

    The interconnected Earth–atmosphere–ocean system includes a number of positive and negative feedback processes that can either strengthen (positive feedback) or weaken (negative feedback) the system’s responses to human and natural influences. These feedbacks operate on a range of time scales from very short (essentially instantaneous) to very long (centuries). Global warming by net radiative forcing over the industrial era includes a substantial amplification from these feedbacks (approximately a factor of three) (high confidence). While there are large uncertainties associated with some of these feedbacks, the net feedback effect over the industrial era has been positive (amplifying warming) and will continue to be positive in coming decades (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 3: Detection and Attribution of Climate Change
    Key Finding 1

    The likely range of the human contribution to the global mean temperature increase over the period 1951–2010 is 1.1° to 1.4°F (0.6° to 0.8°C), and the central estimate of the observed warming of 1.2°F (0.65°C) lies within this range (high confidence). This translates to a likely human contribution of 93%–123% of the observed 1951–2010 change. It is extremely likely that more than half of the global mean temperature increase since 1951 was caused by human influence on climate (high confidence). The likely contributions of natural forcing and internal variability to global temperature change over that period are minor (high confidence).

  • Chapter 3: Detection and Attribution of Climate Change
    Key Finding 2

    The science of event attribution is rapidly advancing through improved understanding of the mechanisms that produce extreme events and the marked progress in development of methods that are used for event attribution (high confidence).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 1

    If greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized at their current level, existing concentrations would commit the world to at least an additional 1.1°F (0.6°C) of warming over this century relative to the last few decades (high confidence in continued warming, medium confidence in amount of warming).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 2

    Over the next two decades, global temperature increase is projected to be between 0.5°F and 1.3°F (0.3°–0.7°C) (medium confidence). This range is primarily due to uncertainties in natural sources of variability that affect short-term trends. In some regions, this means that the trend may not be distinguishable from natural variability (high confidence).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 3

    Beyond the next few decades, the magnitude of climate change depends primarily on cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols and the sensitivity of the climate system to those emissions (high confidence). Projected changes range from 4.7°–8.6°F (2.6°–4.8°C) under the higher scenario (RCP8.5) to 0.5°–1.3°F (0.3°–1.7°C) under the much lower scenario (RCP2.6), for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 4

    Global mean atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration has now passed 400 ppm, a level that last occurred about 3 million years ago, when global average temperature and sea level were significantly higher than today (high confidence). Continued growth in CO2 emissions over this century and beyond would lead to an atmospheric concentration not experienced in tens of millions of years (medium confidence). The present-day emissions rate of nearly 10 GtC per year suggests that there is no climate analog for this century any time in at least the last 50 million years (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 5

    The observed increase in global carbon emissions over the past 15–20 years has been consistent with higher scenarios (very high confidence). In 2014 and 2015, emission growth rates slowed as economic growth has become less carbon-intensive (medium confidence). Even if this trend continues, however, it is not yet at a rate that would limit the increase in the global average temperature to well below 3.6°F (2°C) above preindustrial levels (high confidence).

  • Chapter 4: Climate Models, Scenarios, and Projections
    Key Finding 6

    Combining output from global climate models and dynamical and statistical downscaling models using advanced averaging, weighting, and pattern scaling approaches can result in more relevant and robust future projections. For some regions, sectors, and impacts, these techniques are increasing the ability of the scientific community to provide guidance on the use of climate projections for quantifying regional-scale changes and impacts (medium to high confidence).

  • Chapter 5: Large-Scale Circulation and Climate Variability
    Key Finding 1

    The tropics have expanded poleward by about 70 to 200 miles in each hemisphere over the period 1979–2009, with an accompanying shift of the subtropical dry zones, midlatitude jets, and storm tracks (medium to high confidence). Human activities have played a role in this change (medium confidence), although confidence is presently low regarding the magnitude of the human contribution relative to natural variability.

  • Chapter 5: Large-Scale Circulation and Climate Variability
    Key Finding 2

    Recurring patterns of variability in large-scale atmospheric circulation (such as the North Atlantic Oscillation and Northern Annular Mode) and the atmosphere–ocean system (such as El Niño–Southern Oscillation) cause year-to-year variations in U.S. temperatures and precipitation (high confidence). Changes in the occurrence of these patterns or their properties have contributed to recent U.S. temperature and precipitation trends (medium confidence), although confidence is low regarding the size of the role of human activities in these changes.

  • Chapter 6: Temperature Changes in the United States
    Key Finding 1

    Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States has increased by 1.2°F (0.7°C) for the period 1986–2016 relative to 1901–1960 and by 1.8°F (1.0°C) based on a linear regression for the period 1895–2016 (very high confidence). Surface and satellite data are consistent in their depiction of rapid warming since 1979 (high confidence). Paleo-temperature evidence shows that recent decades are the warmest of the past 1,500 years (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 6: Temperature Changes in the United States
    Key Finding 2

    There have been marked changes in temperature extremes across the contiguous United States. The frequency of cold waves has decreased since the early 1900s, and the frequency of heat waves has increased since the mid-1960s. The Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the peak period for extreme heat. The number of high temperature records set in the past two decades far exceeds the number of low temperature records. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 6: Temperature Changes in the United States
    Key Finding 3

    Annual average temperature over the contiguous United States is projected to rise (very high confidence). Increases of about 2.5°F (1.4°C) are projected for the period 2021–2050 relative to 1976–2005 in all RCP scenarios, implying recent record-setting years may be “common” in the next few decades (high confidence). Much larger rises are projected by late century (2071–2100): 2.8°–7.3°F (1.6°–4.1°C) in a lower scenario (RCP4.5) and 5.8°–11.9°F (3.2°–6.6°C) in the higher scenario (RCP8.5) (high confidence).

  • Chapter 6: Temperature Changes in the United States
    Key Finding 4

    Extreme temperatures in the contiguous United States are projected to increase even more than average temperatures. The temperatures of extremely cold days and extremely warm days are both expected to increase. Cold waves are projected to become less intense while heat waves will become more intense. The number of days below freezing is projected to decline while the number above 90°F will rise. (Very high confidence)

  • Chapter 7: Precipitation Change in the United States
    Key Finding 1

    Annual precipitation has decreased in much of the West, Southwest, and Southeast and increased in most of the Northern and Southern Plains, Midwest, and Northeast. A national average increase of 4% in annual precipitation since 1901 mostly a result of large increases in the fall season. (Medium confidence)

  • Chapter 7: Precipitation Change in the United States
    Key Finding 2

    Heavy precipitation events in most parts of the United States have increased in both intensity and frequency since 1901 (high confidence). There are important regional differences in trends, with the largest increases occurring in the northeastern United States (high confidence). In particular, mesoscale convective systems (organized clusters of thunderstorms)—the main mechanism for warm season precipitation in the central part of the United States—have increased in occurrence and precipitation amounts since 1979 (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 7: Precipitation Change in the United States
    Key Finding 3

    The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events are projected to continue to increase over the 21st century (high confidence). Mesoscale convective systems in the central United States are expected to continue to increase in number and intensity in the future (medium confidence). There are, however, important regional and seasonal differences in projected changes in total precipitation: the northern United States, including Alaska, is projected to receive more precipitation in the winter and spring, and parts of the southwestern United States are projected to receive less precipitation in the winter and spring (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 7: Precipitation Change in the United States
    Key Finding 4

    Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover extent, North America maximum snow depth, snow water equivalent in the western United States, and extreme snowfall years in the southern and western United States have all declined, while extreme snowfall years in parts of the northern United States have increased (medium confidence). Projections indicate large declines in snowpack in the western United States and shifts to more precipitation falling as rain than snow in the cold season in many parts of the central and eastern United States (high confidence).

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 1

    Recent droughts and associated heat waves have reached record intensity in some regions of the United States; however, by geographical scale and duration, the Dust Bowl era of the 1930s remains the benchmark drought and extreme heat event in the historical record (very high confidence). While by some measures drought has decreased over much of the continental United States in association with long-term increases in precipitation, neither the precipitation increases nor inferred drought decreases have been confidently attributed to anthropogenic forcing.

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 2

    The human effect on recent major U.S. droughts is complicated. Little evidence is found for a human influence on observed precipitation deficits, but much evidence is found for a human influence on surface soil moisture deficits due to increased evapotranspiration caused by higher temperatures. (High confidence)

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 3

    Future decreases in surface (top 10 cm) soil moisture from anthropogenic forcing over most of the United States are likely as the climate warms under higher scenarios. (Medium confidence)

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 4

    Substantial reductions in western U.S. winter and spring snowpack are projected as the climate warms. Earlier spring melt and reduced snow water equivalent have been formally attributed to human-induced warming (high confidence) and will very likely be exacerbated as the climate continues to warm (very high confidence). Under higher scenarios, and assuming no change to current water resources management, chronic, long-duration hydrological drought is increasingly possible by the end of this century (very high confidence).

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 5

    Detectable changes in some classes of flood frequency have occurred in parts of the United States and are a mix of increases and decreases. Extreme precipitation, one of the controlling factors in flood statistics, is observed to have generally increased and is projected to continue to do so across the United States in a warming atmosphere. However, formal attribution approaches have not established a significant connection of increased riverine flooding to human-induced climate change, and the timing of any emergence of a future detectable anthropogenic change in flooding is unclear. (Medium confidence)

  • Chapter 8: Droughts, Floods, and Wildfire
    Key Finding 6

    The incidence of large forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased since the early 1980s (high confidence) and is projected to further increase in those regions as the climate warms, with profound changes to certain ecosystems (medium confidence). 

  • Chapter 9: Extreme Storms
    Key Finding 1

    Human activities have contributed substantially to observed ocean–atmosphere variability in the Atlantic Ocean (medium confidence), and these changes have contributed to the observed upward trend in North Atlantic hurricane activity since the 1970s (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 9: Extreme Storms
    Key Finding 2

    Both theory and numerical modeling simulations generally indicate an increase in tropical cyclone (TC) intensity in a warmer world, and the models generally show an increase in the number of very intense TCs. For Atlantic and eastern North Pacific hurricanes and western North Pacific typhoons, increases are projected in precipitation rates (high confidence) and intensity (medium confidence). The frequency of the most intense of these storms is projected to increase in the Atlantic and western North Pacific (low confidence) and in the eastern North Pacific (medium confidence).

  • Chapter 9: Extreme Storms
    Key Finding 3

    Tornado activity in the United States has become more variable, particularly over the 2000s, with a decrease in the number of days per year with tornadoes and an increase in the number of tornadoes on these days (medium confidence). Confidence in past trends for hail and severe thunderstorm winds, however, is low. Climate models consistently project environmental changes that would putatively support an increase in the frequency and intensity of severe thunderstorms (a category that combines tornadoes, hail, and winds), especially over regions that are currently prone to these hazards, but confidence in the details of this projected increase is low.

  • Chapter 9: Extreme Storms
    Key Finding 4

    There has been a trend toward earlier snowmelt and a decrease in snowstorm frequency on the southern margins of climatologically snowy areas (medium confidence). Winter storm tracks have shifted northward since 1950 over the Northern Hemisphere (medium confidence). Projections of winter storm frequency and intensity over the United States vary from increasing to decreasing depending on region, but model agreement is poor and confidence is low. Potential linkages between the frequency and intensity of severe winter storms in the United States and accelerated warming in the Arctic have been postulated, but they are complex, and, to some extent contested, and confidence in the connection is currently low.

  • Chapter 9: Extreme Storms
    Key Finding 5

    The frequency and severity of landfalling “atmospheric rivers” on the U.S. West Coast (narrow streams of moisture that account for 30%–40% of the typical snowpack and annual precipitation in the region and are associated with severe flooding events) will increase as a result of increasing evaporation and resulting higher atmospheric water vapor that occurs with increasing temperature. (Medium confidence)